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Abstract
In 2011, the U.K. government announced that the national meteorological agency 
would be releasing a significant volume of data as part of its Open Data policy agenda. 
This article explores the interrelationship between this announcement and efforts 
to boost the competitiveness of the United Kingdom’s weather derivatives industry. 
Primary qualitative data are analyzed to produce a genealogical account of these policy 
developments, and Braman’s concept of “informational power” is used to frame a 
critical narrative of the broader dynamics of power at play. We argue that although 
there have been significant tensions around efforts to open the United Kingdom’s 
weather data, these have largely been absorbed by and, ultimately, contained within 
the hegemonic structures of the United Kingdom’s neoliberal state. We conclude by 
arguing that this struggle needs to be broadened and externalized beyond the state 
so that critical questions about the deepening data-driven financialization of climate 
change can be addressed.
Keywords
weather derivatives, climate risk markets, open data, meteorological data, data policy, 
informational power
Introduction
Media are increasingly constituted by data: “binary elements (digits, symbols, electri-
cal signals, magnetic patterns, etc.) processed and transmitted electronically by tech-
nologies such as computers and cellular phones” (Floridi 2008, 3). The binary nature 
of digital data enables them to be reused and put to work for different purposes in 
different places and contexts, often in unexpected ways. New patterns of data flow and 
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reuse contribute to the emergence of what Jose van Dijck (2013) calls “the ecosystems 
of connectivity,” through which social actors are becoming increasingly intercon-
nected. Although van Dijck and others draw attention to these processes primarily in 
relation to social media data, many other types of data contribute to emergent forms of 
interconnectivity. Attention needs to be paid to some of these less-familiar data flows, 
examining where data flow and why and in whose interests data flows are being 
shaped and reshaped. This article aims to take this step, focusing specifically on efforts 
to make data flow for the climate risk market.
In November 2011, the U.K. government announced that the national meteorologi-
cal organization would be releasing the largest volume of “open” weather data made 
available by any country (HM Government 2011a), meaning that vast amounts of data 
would be made publicly accessible and freely reusable by anyone. At one level, this 
announcement can be read as part of the successful rollout of the government’s flag-
ship Open Data agenda—a widely celebrated policy initiative that has cross-party sup-
port and which is part of a wider program of “open” initiatives, including mandated 
open access to research publications and data. However, the specific ways in which 
these “open” initiatives are being shaped has been critiqued, with a number of authors 
identifying a process of co-option of the commons-based principles and practices of 
many open initiatives by commercial interests (see, for example, Bates 2012 and 
Muellerleile, forthcoming). There are clearly a wide range of sociotechnical drivers 
behind efforts to open data (Bates 2014; Longo 2011; Martin 2014; Saxby 2011). It is 
therefore important to unpack the underlying power dynamics that are driving key 
decisions and developments in particular national contexts.
In the case of efforts to “open” the United Kingdom’s meteorological data, closer 
inspection illustrates that the decision to open data was tied to a further policy narra-
tive that centered around efforts to make meteorological data more readily exploitable 
by traders engaged in the climate risk market—a market that enables hedging against 
and speculation on climatic uncertainty. By opening meteorological data, it was 
argued, financial and administrative barriers experienced by traders and other com-
mercial reusers of data would be reduced, and thus, the competitive position of the 
City of London in the global financial markets could be enhanced. In this article, we 
draw out this lesser-known narrative—analyzing key events, discourses, silences, rela-
tionships, and tensions—to illuminate some of the unexpected ways that data are being 
used and data policies are being shaped to better position data as a constitutive force 
in the accumulation of financial capital.
We draw upon empirical research conducted on two intersecting research projects: 
one on Open Government Data and the other on meteorological data infrastructures. 
Across the two projects, thirty-nine semi-structured interviews, textual analysis of key 
policy and industry documentation, and observations of relevant events and working 
practices were conducted. This combined body of research informs our understanding 
of the broader context that the developments discussed in this article are situated 
within. The core of our analysis draws upon a subsection of this empirical work and is 
based upon the following: (1) semi-structured interviews with key informants, includ-
ing two senior representatives of a small firm that acts as an important data 
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intermediary in the climate risk industry (interview codes: DS1 and DS2) and three 
senior policy officials in central government departments (interview codes: GOV1 and 
GOV2) and the Met Office (interview code: MO2); (2) documentary resources, includ-
ing a thorough review of relevant policy documentation and announcements on Open 
Data and Re-use of Public Sector Information, industry press releases and reports, and 
websites of relevant firms and organizations such as the Weather Risk Management 
Association (WRMA); and (3) observations of working practices in the data interme-
diary firm and Met Office. The specificity of the topic means that only a few individu-
als and organizations have been directly involved in these developments, and this 
subsection of interviewees is therefore small; however, among them are important and 
influential actors within this space. Of this subsection of interviews, all were con-
ducted in 2014, apart from one interview conducted with a senior central government 
policy maker in 2011 (GOV2). Observations were undertaken in 2014. Documentary 
data collection and analysis was conducted on an ongoing basis between 2010 and 
2015. These primary data were analyzed alongside secondary sources from the aca-
demic literature and industry press to develop a genealogical account—“a history of 
present” (Meadmore et al. 2010)—through examination of the related events, dis-
courses, relations, and struggles behind the U.K. government’s 2011 announcement 
(Carroll 2004, 228). The aim of this analysis is to shine a light on some of the estab-
lished claims around opening the United Kingdom’s meteorological data, and to 
develop a critical narrative of the politics and power playing out behind the scenes.
We begin the article by drawing upon a review of primary and secondary sources 
from the academic, media, and industry literatures to provide a detailed overview of 
developments in the climate risk industry over the last two decades. We then draw 
upon our analysis of the empirical data to examine in depth ongoing efforts in the 
United Kingdom to “open” the meteorological data that the climate risk industry is 
dependent upon prior to using Braman’s (2006) concept of “informational power” as 
a lens through which to analyze the broader context and dynamics of power surround-
ing these developments. We argue that although there have been significant tensions 
around efforts to “open” the United Kingdom’s weather data, these have largely been 
absorbed by and, ultimately, contained within the hegemonic structures of the United 
Kingdom’s neoliberal state. We conclude by arguing that this struggle needs to be 
broadened and externalized beyond the state so that critical questions about the deep-
ening data-driven financialization of climate change can be addressed.
Weather Derivatives and the Financial Markets
Weather derivatives are a type of climate risk product traded in the global financial 
markets. Key actors include businesses wanting to hedge against climate risk, reinsur-
ance firms, institutional investors, and exchanges such as the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange (CME). Since the mid-1990s, the United Kingdom economy has become 
increasingly dependent upon the wider financial sector (Berry 2013). This increased 
dominance of the sector is largely the result of the competitive “de-regulation” (Stiglitz 
2012) and “re-regulation” (Major 2012) of financial markets by the U.S. and U.K. 
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governments since the 1980s: a process that contributed to the development of an 
“Anglo-liberal growth model” (Hay 2010) of a strong postindustrial service sector 
powered by a lightly regulated global financial center (i.e., the City of London) that 
was imagined by advocates as a “model for the future” (Jodal et al. 2012). These 
developments opened the way for a variety of innovations in financial products and 
services, led to significant growth in the sector’s contribution to the United Kingdom’s 
GDP, and, ultimately, contributed significantly to the financial crisis of 2008 (Berry 
2013; Hay 2010). Despite the financial crash, the U.K. economy remains heavily 
dependent upon the finance sector (Berry 2013), and it is perceived that the power and 
influence of the City of London has strengthened postcrash (Berry 2013; Jodal et al. 
2012). These observations draw attention to the continuing, potentially increasing, 
power of the financial sector within the United Kingdom. They also highlight the 
attention paid by U.K.-based advocates of this Anglo-liberal model of economic 
growth to how the City of London is competitively positioned, particularly in relation 
to the U.S. financial sector.
Weather derivatives are a relatively niche product traded within this wider financial 
sector. The products cover businesses for “moderate departures” from expected 
weather conditions as opposed to traditional indemnity insurance, which covers “large 
departures and catastrophes” (Dischel 2002, 8). Rather than insuring against a specific 
observable loss, payouts on these products are instead triggered when particular mete-
orological conditions, as written into contracts, are detected in vast indices of weather 
observation data.
Much of the primary market trading in weather derivatives occurs in the over-the-
counter market, through which bespoke contracts are negotiated in private between 
buyers and sellers (Speedwell Weather, n.d.). Buyers typically are firms in sectors 
such as energy, agriculture, and construction, while sellers tend to be reinsurance firms 
such as Swiss Re. Although many buyers in the primary markets have traditionally 
been aiming to hedge against weather risks, a new class of speculative investor in 
weather risk has emerged postfinancial crash. In 2013, the largest source of new trades 
in the market was from hedge funds speculating on average monthly temperatures 
(Thind 2014). There is also a secondary market in weather derivatives that trades pri-
marily through the CME (SCOR 2012). In this secondary market, primary market 
contracts are traded to manage risk.
The success of the weather derivative market over the last two decades has been 
mixed. Although the market saw significant growth in the mid-2000s, it suffered dur-
ing the financial downturn and showed only slow signs of growth by 2011 (notional 
trading value of $11.8 billion; WRMA 2011). These figures, based upon surveys 
undertaken by PricewaterhouseCoopers on behalf of the WRMA, cover the period 
2003 to 2011. No surveys have been published since 2011, and no up-to-date figures 
for the size of the market therefore exist. However, in 2011, the WRMA was hopeful 
for weather derivatives, pointing to continuing growth outside the U.S. markets 
throughout the downturn, growing interest in nontemperature-related weather deriva-
tives, and increasing interest from outside the energy industry (WRMA 2011), and 
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more recent industry reports suggest that the market is beginning to expand (Thind 
2014).
Making Data Flow for the Market
As financial products based on vast indices of weather observations, weather deriva-
tives and similar products are dependent upon traders’ access to meteorological data. 
During the early years of weather derivatives trading, the right to reuse without charge 
weather data produced by national meteorological agencies was a prominent discourse 
at industry events (DS1). Over recent years, focus on this issue has reduced; however, 
the ease with which market actors can access and reuse publicly funded meteorologi-
cal data is still perceived to be a significant issue, and a lack of freely available data in 
some countries is perceived as a barrier to market growth (DS1). Although lack of data 
is a key issue in many countries, restrictions on commercial actors’ access to and reuse 
of public meteorological data are perceived to be a significant problem in others. 
Although some countries, such as the United States, make their data freely accessible 
for commercial reuse, many others—including the United Kingdom—charge (DS1).
Although the climate risk market used to be largely dependent upon data from pub-
lic meteorological organizations (Dischel and Barrieu 2002), in recent years, data 
intermediaries that supply the market have been capturing data from an increasingly 
diverse range of public, private, and amateur sources (DS1). However, despite this 
diversification of sources, data produced by national meteorological organizations are 
still perceived to be crucial due to their quality and the scope of their archives:
The national met offices . . . will always be higher quality than other data sources . . . 
because they’re posher instruments. (DS1)
Our preference is to work with the national Met Service in any country . . . they are the 
most likely to have the longest records and hold the national archive, which is of huge 
importance to us . . . they should be adhering to WMO [World Meteorological 
Organization] standards. (DS2)
In the United Kingdom, the national meteorological organization—the Met Office—
has functioned as a commercial Trading Fund since 1996, making it dependent upon 
the commercial exploitation of its meteorological data and services. Although a sub-
stantial proportion of Met Office income comes from its contract with the U.K. gov-
ernment for provision of the Public Weather Service, as a Trading Fund, it must also 
exploit its data more widely, including through levying charges for commercial reuse.
Those advocating for the development of weather derivative markets have chal-
lenged this commercialization of meteorological data for a number of years (see 
Randalls 2006 for a previous empirical study of this issue in the United Kingdom). 
They have called for Met Office data to be made available at marginal cost so that data 
intermediary firms and traders in the sector can freely access and reuse it. It is argued 
that such measures would enable U.K. and other European markets to compete more 
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effectively with the U.S. markets where data are openly available free of charge. In an 
article frequently cited in support of such arguments, Weiss (2002) calculated that 
restricted access to European meteorological data had resulted in a weather risk man-
agement industry 13.5 times smaller than the nascent U.S. industry, which by 2002 had 
built up US$9.7 billion of contract value in more than five years.
Convincing the Policy Makers
One organization that has been engaged in advocating for open meteorological data on 
behalf of the weather derivatives industry is the WRMA. Although one market actor 
perceived the WRMA to be a mere “talking shop” (DS1), attendees of the 2002 and 
2003 WRMA conferences included powerful and significant players within the global 
economy: CME, Goldman Sachs, Ernst & Young, Citigroup, PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
JP Morgan, Entergy-Koch Trading, reinsurance companies including Swiss Re and 
AXA Re, energy companies including BP Energy and Centrica, risk modelers such as 
Risk Management Solutions, and data suppliers to the weather markets such as 
Speedwell Weather Derivatives (WRMA 2007).
Between them, these organizations have had significant influence on U.K. policy 
makers’ beliefs about how reuse of meteorological data should be governed. For 
example, the WRMA, some of the conference attendees named above, and other pow-
erful actors in the United Kingdom’s financial sector such as the Lighthill Risk 
Network—a network cofounded by key players in the reinsurance industry including 
Aon Benfield and Lloyd’s of London—are cited, along with Weiss (2002), in a 2008 
policy document that calls for industry demands for “freer access to UK and other 
European weather data” to be taken into account by the U.K. government (Department 
for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 2008, 52).
Similar arguments are also made in commissioned policy research. The “Models of 
Public Sector Information Provision via Trading Funds” report (aka “the Cambridge 
Study”; Newbery et al. 2008), commissioned from economists at Cambridge University 
by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills and HM Treasury, presents an 
analysis of the optimal charging policy for “unrefined” public data. Echoing argu-
ments made in previous reports about the monopoly position Trading Funds such as 
the Met Office had acquired in the information market (e.g., Office of Fair Trading 
2006), Newbery et al. (2008, 109) conclude that Trading Funds “enjoy a near- 
monopoly . . . a monopoly furthermore made possible or strengthened by government 
activity.” Furthermore, they argue that it would be economically advantageous to have 
a marginal cost pricing model for “unrefined” core public data such as meteorological 
data. The report draws upon Weiss (2002) to demonstrate some of the benefits of such 
a move, arguing that growth of the weather derivatives industry is one potential eco-
nomic benefit of marginal cost meteorological data.
Interestingly, one of the authors of the Cambridge Study, Rufus Pollock, is a key Open 
Data advocate in the United Kingdom and cofounder and president of the international 
nonprofit network Open Knowledge (formerly Open Knowledge Foundation). As the 
United Kingdom’s civil society Open Government Data initiative grew in strength from 
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around 2008, the Open Knowledge Foundation and other Open Data groups around the 
United Kingdom were also responsible for increasing the pressure on policy makers to 
question the Trading Fund model of commercialization of core public data, and in 2010, 
Pollock was invited to join the new coalition government’s Transparency Board to advise on 
Open Data policy. During this period, as the Open Data campaign grew in strength, it 
became clear that the language of “Open Data” was being adopted and becoming increas-
ingly influential within key parts of central government. The language of “Open Data” is 
readily observable in policy documentation and in all our interviews with policy makers—
with one claiming to “go with the Pollock line” on the issue of Open Data (GOV2). However, 
not all civil servants were in favor, and there was perceived to be a tension between Open 
Data advocates based in the Cabinet Office and parts of the Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills, and the “old school” in HM Treasury and the Shareholder Executive 
that favored managing public data as a commercial asset to be exploited by the state (GOV2).
What is observable in these early developments is an increasing awareness within 
central government that the deep commercialization of the national core data infrastruc-
ture that was a key component of the first two decades of neoliberalization of the U.K. 
state had created a monopoly position for the Trading Funds in the information market, 
which was not necessarily in the best interests of competition and growth. During the 
early years (1980s) of the United Kingdom’s neoliberal state, under the broader frame-
work of the “Rayner Doctrine,” public institutions were actively encouraged by the gov-
ernment only to produce data to satisfy the needs of the state, and it was mandated that if 
nonstate organizations needed these data, they would have to pay for it (Blakemore and 
Craglia 2006, 18). Essentially, this approach positioned the state as a self-interested, albeit 
heavily restricted, actor in the information market. This policy shifted in the 1990s, when 
it was acknowledged that the neoliberal state also had a role in producing data for busi-
ness and the wider public, and that this presented a significant commercial opportunity for 
public bodies such as the Met Office (Blakemore and Craglia 2006): a shift that led to the 
deepening commercialization of core parts of the United Kingdom’s public data infra-
structure through the Trading Fund model of governance. Over the last decade, however, 
thinking on core infrastructural data has shifted again, with many key policy makers, 
advisors, and politicians now arguing that such data should be “open,” and treated as an 
economic resource that can be freely exploited by market actors to generate economic 
activity and growth (e.g., Deloitte 2013; Newbery et al. 2008; Shakespeare 2013). This 
shift and tension in center-right thinking is neatly expressed by one market actor:
I mean I think, I’m essentially a Thatcherite [but] . . . provision of meteorological data in a 
nation is an infrastructure good . . . so therefore it’s a public good and should stay in the 
public . . . So how do you avoid [creating] the antithesis of a public good? You make it free. 
So it’s actually, I suppose in spirit it’s extremely socialist isn’t it? . . . The very first thing they 
should do is to stop tolls on bridges. And if they get that then Open Data will come. (DS1)
Here, we can observe the co-option of the “socialist” notion of a public good (i.e., the 
commons, welfare, etc.) into a “Thatcherite” vision of state provision of key infra-
structural resources demanded by market actors: a vision that avoids any consideration 
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of the broader notion of the public or common good or whose interests are advanced 
when decisions are made regarding priorities and criteria for opening public sector 
data.
The Decision to Open the Data
Following on from early interventions by policy makers and advisers, meteorological 
data became “one of the early priorities” (GOV1) of the United Kingdom’s Open 
Government Data agenda, initially in the last year or so of the Labour Government 
(1997–2010) and then during the early years of the coalition government (2010–
2015) when Open Data became a flagship policy as part of the new Transparency and 
Open Government Data agenda. In the Autumn Statement of 2011, the policy devel-
opments around “opening” Met Office data came to a head with the announcement by 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, that the U.K. government was open-
ing “the largest volume of high quality weather data and information made available 
by a national meteorological organisation anywhere in the world” for anyone to reuse 
without charge (HM Government 2011a, 10).
According to senior policy makers interviewed in 2011 and 2014, it was anticipated 
by them that these proposals would contribute to the development of a national data 
infrastructure that would make the U.K. weather risk markets more competitive with 
the U.S.-based markets (GOV2, GOV1): a discourse that fits within the broader com-
petitive drive that shaped developments in transatlantic regulation of the financial sec-
tor in the preceding decades.
The commercial side, you know the classic Peter Weiss analysis from about ten years ago 
on the weather markets in Europe against the weather markets in the U.S. . . . It also 
showed things like weather derivatives . . . Which was very much larger in the U.S. than 
in the U.K., and the Weiss figures for weather derivatives were a snapshot, in fact they’ve 
grown to a much more significant figure in the U.S. (GOV1)
A similar emphasis on supporting the growth of the climate risk market is also observ-
able within key Open Data policy documentation and a speech made by senior 
Conservative politician and Open Data advocate Francis Maude, who at the time was 
Minster for the Cabinet Office:
The role of this public data in supporting a rapidly growing weather risk management 
industry underwriting financial risk management instruments, valued at approximately 
$8 billion. (HM Government 2011b, 53)
The opportunities for enterprise won’t always be obvious. For example when some years 
ago the US released its public weather service one surprise result was a boost to the 
insurance industry. The data helped farmers to protect their profits leading to dramatic 
improvements in agricultural productivity. Today the weather derivatives market in the 
US alone is worth $3.5billion—that’s all powered by Big Data. (Maude 2012)
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Although much of the popular discourse around Open Data has tended to emphasize 
its benefits for democratic reform and easing reuse of public data by small and 
medium-sized enterprises (Bates 2012), it is clear that influential sections of the U.K. 
government including senior politicians and policy makers perceived that the Open 
Data agenda could also be used to push for the “opening” of Met Office data with the 
aim of promoting the growth of the climate risk industry.
The Met Office Responds
The Met Office has found adapting to this new Open Data landscape challenging, and 
some policy makers have complained about the Met Office being “resistant” (GOV1) 
to opening data, particularly historical data, which is of significant value to the climate 
risk industry. This perceived “resistance” is not connected to the relationship between 
open weather data and the growth of climate risk markets. In fact, over the years, the 
Met Office has been engaged directly within the weather derivatives industry in differ-
ent ways. In 2001, for example, the Met Office established a data intermediary com-
pany called weatherXchange in partnership with the financial broker Umbrella Brokers 
to supply data to the weather derivatives market. The venture failed in part because the 
Met Office, on realizing the revenue to be generated through the sale of data to this 
market, began to compete with and “deliberately undercut” weatherXchange (Randalls 
2010, 706). Eventually, the data part of the weatherXchange business was sold to 
Speedwell Weather Derivatives, which is now a key data intermediary in the climate 
risk market.
The challenges faced by the Met Office in adopting an Open Data policy are pri-
marily based upon the government-mandated Trading Fund model under which it 
operates as well as the complexity of the data that it generates, manages, and pro-
cesses. As one Met Office participant described, the organization felt somewhat threat-
ened by the new Open Data landscape:
So we wouldn’t have chosen to have made data openly available specifically had it not 
been for the government’s drive for Open Data and the way that that was going . . . We 
realised that as a Trading Fund that causes us issues because if we provide the data for 
free then it’s very difficult to . . . not only sell the data, but also it means that you’re 
opening up a huge amount of competition, they’re getting the data for free . . . And 
because of the way the organisation is set up we’re not as agile as we would like to be in 
some cases, and certainly not on the commercial side. (MO2)
Despite these challenges and concerns, the Met Office has made significant amounts 
of data open.
So our Open Data is the data that’s on our website. So that is our weather forecast data  
. . . some climate data as well, so we have things like the anomalies and averages . . . So 
that was agreed with the Cabinet Office . . . we needed to somehow scope and we said 
“Well, if it’s on our website and people are using it, then that would seem like a reasonable 
kind of boundary of what is Open Data.” (MO2)
10 Television & New Media 
It has also developed the DataPoint application programming interface (API), which 
enables free access to real-time Open Data; however, restrictions on the number of 
data requests that can be made via the API makes it less useful for firms with a high 
demand for data such as data intermediaries in the climate risk industry.
I think I have come across that [DataPoint API], but that’s not something we use, no. 
Okay, so if that were to be broadened . . . . (DS1)
A further area of contention with some policy makers has been around the opening of 
the Met Office’s historic data. As mentioned above, access to archives of meteorologi-
cal data is vital for the weather risk industry—one participant deemed “access to the 
national archive” the “primary” reason that data intermediaries prefer working with 
national meteorological organizations (DS2). Currently, historic data are not Open 
Data and are only available for commercial reuse through the Met Office’s commer-
cial team (MO2). That the Met Office’s historical data remain a commercial product 
has been met with frustration by both market actors and policy makers advocating for 
the weather risk industry:
I don’t think they’ve implemented in spirit or probably in letter what ministers agreed and 
announced they would do . . . Historical data – they’ve dragged on—but they’ve definitely 
digitised—it has proved in other countries to be enormous value . . . So, for instance 
Climate Corp in the U.S. (GOV1)
Despite these barriers to opening data, the pressure for open meteorological data in the 
United Kingdom continues. New European Union (EU) Re-Use of Public Sector 
Information regulations aim to further enforce the marginal cost pricing model for 
public data across the EU, and although there are still exemptions in these regulations 
for Trading Funds, the economic opportunities of Open Data are increasingly accepted 
by policy makers and politicians. The Met Office has also become a partner of the 
Open Data Institute’s membership program in a bid to drive forward its Open Data 
activity. However, the need to invest significantly in the management of some data 
remains a significant barrier to widening the scope of the Met Office’s Open Data 
policy, particularly given the organization perceives no “customer demand” for such 
investment (HM Government 2014). Although over the last decade there have been 
significant steps toward meeting the weather risk industry’s demand for open meteo-
rological data and the momentum currently continues in that direction, the struggle is 
therefore still ongoing.
Data Power and the Climate Risk Market
In her analysis of the development of the “informational state,” Sandra Braman (2006) 
observes a deepening form of “informational power” emerging in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Although traditional analyses of power have tended to emphasize its instrumental, 
structural, and symbolic forms, Braman (2006, 26–27) argues that over recent decades, 
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processes of information intensification have led to a fourth form—“informational 
power”—becoming more central to the working of contemporary power relations. 
Illustrating her argument with reference to Smart Weapons, Internet surveillance, per-
sonalized web services, social profiling, and manipulation of public opinion, this 
“informational” form of power, she argues, interacts with other forms of power by 
“manipulating” their “informational bases.” Similar processes are also identified by 
Harvey (2007, 3) when he observes the necessity for the development of “technologies 
of information creation and capacities to accumulate, store, transfer, analyse, and use 
massive databases to guide decisions in the global marketplace” in the practice of real-
izing neoliberal ideas.
As Braman (2006, 27) argues, the relations between instrumental, structural, sym-
bolic, and informational forms of power are “multiple . . . usually interdependent . . . 
and may be cumulative.” In the struggles to open the United Kingdom’s meteorologi-
cal data, the above discussion evidences a complex interplay of powers aiming to 
shape the informational base, in this case, the public data infrastructure, to open data 
so that they are more conducive to global finance’s ability to exercise power through 
exploitation of systemic uncertainty in the global climate. Efforts to open the United 
Kingdom’s meteorological data have been driven by the exercising of both symbolic 
and structural forms of power that are intersecting to reshape the informational base.
Although the unfolding of social relations over time means that an isolated starting 
point for these developments cannot be readily identified, for the purpose of construct-
ing a narrative about the underlying power relations, one place to begin is the increas-
ing political power of financial capital in the United Kingdom as the government 
deepened its process of competitive deregulation with the United States in the 1990s. 
As Jodal et al. (2012) argue, the narrative constructed by financial elites and their 
political allies about the role of the finance sector in creating a prosperous postindus-
trial economy was largely ideological. However, what was “striking” about these 
developments was the combination of structural and symbolic forces that allowed an 
emergent financial elite to “convert economic muscle into influence over policy” dur-
ing the 1990s and early 2000s through professionalization of their lobbying activities 
and the construction of strong relationships with political actors, particularly in the 
major political parties. These developments, Jodal et al. (2012) conclude, produced a 
“new, formidable politics of the City,” barely vulnerable even in the face of the 2007–
2008 financial crisis and its aftermath.
Yet despite this “formidable” political power of the City of London, the rather 
obscure demand of the weather risk industry for marginal cost reuse of the United 
Kingdom’s meteorological data was, at first, relatively unheard in policy circles. As 
the demand percolated slowly from industry to policy makers in the 2000s, advocates 
of the weather derivatives industry were able to take advantage of a further symbolic 
force emerging in the United Kingdom in the mid-2000s: the growing demand for 
Open Data. Although the call for “Open Data” emerged initially as a civil society ini-
tiative aimed at the development of a more democratic and accessible data infrastruc-
ture, the concept was soon adopted by powerful political and commercial actors who 
had been lobbying for free commercial reuse of the United Kingdom’s public data for 
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a number of years (Bates 2014). The empirical data suggest that the interweaving of 
these two narratives about the role of the finance sector and the benefits of Open Data 
in the minds of key political actors led to a growing demand inside the state for struc-
tural changes aimed at opening the United Kingdom’s meteorological data to bolster 
the weather derivatives industry. As explored above, however, these efforts to open 
meteorological data have faced challenges as a result of the Trading Fund model insti-
tuted as part of the previous shift in center-right thinking about the economics of pub-
lic data in the 1990s.
The resulting tensions around opening meteorological data have largely been about 
the impact on the Met Office as a commercial Trading Fund if it opens data that it cur-
rently extracts revenue from and whether significant investments should be made to 
open data for which there is no widespread demand. What is interesting and important 
to observe is that this tension around opening the United Kingdom’s meteorological 
data has not been about whether the government should be opening publicly funded 
meteorological data so that it can be more readily exploited by the climate risk indus-
try. Rather, the tension relates to a shift in center-right thinking and policy regarding 
how to treat public meteorological data as an economic resource: a shift that has been 
influenced by demands from both the financial sector and civil society Open Data 
advocates.
Thus far, the struggle to open the United Kingdom’s meteorological data has there-
fore been largely contained within the hegemonic framework of the United Kingdom’s 
neoliberal state and the demands of the wider Open Data movement. Significantly, the 
arguably bigger question of whether part of the public data infrastructure should be 
restructured to enhance the competitive position of the United Kingdom’s financial 
sector in the weather derivative markets has not been addressed. Indeed, although oth-
ers have questioned the efficacy of financialization as a means of addressing climate-
related risk (Cooper 2010; Fuchs and Wolff 2011; Isakson 2015; Randalls 2013), 
significant questions still remain unanswered about the material impacts of weather 
derivatives markets, particularly in relation to their potential to disincentivize eco-
nomically powerful actors’ engagement in climate change mitigation activity and the 
socioeconomic implications of empowering financial elites’ efforts to exploit deepen-
ing climate uncertainty.
Conclusion
The genealogy presented above demonstrates some of the complex dynamics of power 
and influence in the ongoing efforts to open the United Kingdom’s meteorological 
data. As Braman (2006, 7) argues, it can be illuminating to “look where the light don’t 
shine” to get a better appreciation for the influence of data policy on broader societal 
developments. It would be problematic to argue that increased access and rights to 
reuse weather data are something to be resisted—data are, after all, also necessary for 
those seeking to establish sustainable, democratic, and ecologically sound political 
economies. However, the United Kingdom’s Open Data agenda, working under the 
neoliberal assumption that all economic growth is socially beneficial, aims primarily 
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to set market forces to work on public data. This assumption needs complicating. Open 
data policies are a key means for reducing barriers to data flow and thus contribute 
directly to the development of emergent “ecosystems of connectivity” that bring social 
actors into new forms of relation with one another. The above research demonstrates 
that closer attention needs to be paid to how Open Data are being used in different 
contexts, in whose interests data flows are being shaped and reshaped, and, ultimately, 
how opening data enhances its role as a constitutive force in the development of social 
relations.
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